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Chaos or Coherence: Individual
Disparate Treatment
Discrimination and the ADEA
by Michael J. Zimmer*
Individual disparate treatment law appears to be in a chaotic state.
The one clear thrust is that the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the
area, and even Congress's most recent amendments1 to Title VII,2 no
longer govern the field alone. This chaos, however, may be the prelude
to a new coherence. That possibility is the point of this Article, which
will explore it from the viewpoint of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ("ADEA").3
Part I sets the stage by describing the initial failure of Justice
Brennan's attempt in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins4 to supplant the pre-
existing framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green5
with a new framework. The actual effect of Price Waterhouse was not
only to create a new, alternative approach to analyzing individual
disparate treatment cases, but also to limit the application of that
approach to a small subset of cases involving "direct" evidence of
discrimination. Even Congress's 1991 amendments to Title VII did not
have the immediate effect of removing the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work as the general approach applied to most cases. Part II traces
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. Marquette University (A.B.,
1967; J.D., 1967); Columbia University (L.L.M., 1976).
My thanks to Margaret L. Moses and to Jon Greene, Class of 2001, for his fine research
assistance. The Dean's Fellowship of Seton Hall Law School provided released time and
funds to make this project possible.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West
1994 & Supp. 1999).
3. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
4. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
5. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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recent developments among the courts of appeals. These decisions have
taken a number of different approaches that have differing effects on the
existing law of individual disparate treatment discrimination. The most
significant decisions have supplanted the McDonnell Douglas approach
in Title VII cases with a modified Price Waterhouse approach. Part III
then addresses whether such new approaches should be applied in
individual disparate treatment cases in which plaintiffs have asserted
age discrimination under the ADEA. Finally, Part IV looks to the
consequences of these developments in terms of the remedies available
in age discrimination cases.
I. THE INITIAL FAILURE OF JUSTICE BRENNAN IN PRICE WATERHOUSE
A quick trip down memory lane sets the backdrop for where we are
now. In 1973 the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas created a
standard for proving a prima facie case of discrimination that was easy
for plaintiffs to establish." By 1981, in Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine,7 the Supreme Court started cutting back on
McDonnell Douglas. The defendant's rebuttal became as easy to
establish as the plaintiff's prima facie case showing, and the Court made
it clear that, in the final analysis, the plaintiff had the ultimate burden
of proving that she was the victim of intentional discrimination.' The
evisceration of McDonnell Douglas that began in Burdine was not
completed until the 1993 decisions in Hazen Paper Co. v. Bigginso and
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.'0 Since then critics have charged
that the way courts apply McDonnell Douglas, and perhaps McDonnell
Douglas itself, has become an obstacle rather than an aid to the full
enforcement of our antidiscrimination laws."
6. Id. at 802 (holding that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case "by showing (i)
that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications").
7. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
8. Id. at 256.
9. 507 U.S. 604,608-14 (1993) (limiting the range of relevant circumstantial evidence,
and expanding the scope of the employer's rebuttal to include even illegal reasons).
10. 509 U.S. 502, 514-20 (1993) (holding that plaintiffs proof that defendant's reason
is not true is insufficient by itself to support a finding of liability).
11. Hicks produced an outpouring of commentary, most of it quite critical. See, e.g.,
Stephen Plass, Truth: The Lost Virtue in Title VII Litigation, 29 SEToN HALL L. REv. 599
(1998); Ruth Gana Okediji, Status Rules: Doctrine as Discrimination in a Post-Hicks
Environment, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 49 (1998); Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstan-
tial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
Pretext, and the "Personality"Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 183 (1997); Kenneth
694 [Vol. 51
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In 1989, before the full retreat on McDonnell Douglas had become
clear, Justice Brennan tried unsuccessfully to establish a new method of
proof that would supplant McDonnell Douglas as the primary approach
for analyzing individual disparate treatment cases. In Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins,12 Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality of four, said that
to establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff need only prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that her race, gender, or other protected
characteristic was a motivating factor for the employer's decision she
challenged.13 Upon that showing, the burden of persuasion shifts to the
defendant to try to avoid liability by proving as an affirmative defense
that it would have made the same decision absent the discrimination. 4
In a footnote Justice Brennan indicated that this new approach would
take precedence over, but would not completely replace, the McDonnell
Douglas method. 5 For all practical purposes, however, the net effect
would be that the new approach would supplant McDonnell Douglas.
The footnote starts with the proposition that "plaintiffs often will allege,
in the alternative, that their cases are both [Price Waterhouse and
McDonnell Douglas cases]."" Once discovery is complete, the trial
judge must decide whether there is evidence to support the Price
Waterhouse approach, which applies whenever there is evidence that
"both legitimate and illegitimate considerations played a part in the
decision against" the plaintiff. 7 If there is, then the "particular case
involves mixed motives." 8 Because in every McDonnell Douglas case
there is the plaintiff's evidence that an illegitimate consideration was
involved as well as the defendant's evidence of a nondiscriminatory
reason for its action, it would seem that evidence of more than one
motive is present in the record in every case. That would seem to allow
R. Davis, The Stumbling Three.Step, Burden-Shifting Approach in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703 (1995); Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and
Ideology: The Wages of Sin Is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 939 (1995);
Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption,
26 CONN. L. REV. 997 (1994); Melissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas
v. Green: The High Court Muddies the Evidentiary Waters in Circumstantial Discrimina-
tion Cases, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 385 (1994). But see William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater,
and Throwing Out Proof Structures: It Is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2
EMPLOYEE RTs. & EMPLOYMENT POL J. 361 (1998); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last
Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995).
12. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
13. Id. at 258.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 247 n.12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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the factfinder to find in every case one of three possible outcomes: (1)
the motive was only the one asserted by the plaintiff; (2) the motive was
only the one asserted by the defendant; or (3) both were to some extent
involved so that the motives could be said to be mixed. With such
evidence in the record, the case should then be sent to the factfinder,
first on the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives theory and then, if the jury
does not find for the plaintiff on that approach, on the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine circumstantial evidence theory. "If the plaintiff fails
to satisfy the factfinder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden
characteristic played a part in the employment decision," thereby failing
to prove the Price Waterhouse count, "then she may prevail only if she
proves, following Burdine, that the employer's stated reason for its
decision is pretextual." 9 What Justice Brennan did not say, at that
point, is what happens to the McDonnell Douglas count if the plaintiff
is successful in proving the Price Waterhouse count that "more likely
than not ] forbidden characteristic played a part in the employment
decision."20 Presumably, if the factfinder so concludes, there is no need
to go further with the McDonnell Douglas inquiry. Instead, the
factfinder should, if the defendant has introduced evidence sufficient to
create a material issue of fact on the point, proceed directly to the
affirmative defense of deciding whether "the defendant may avoid...
liability.., by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would
have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's
gender into account."
21
While Justice Brennan claimed that Price Waterhouse did not affect
McDonnell Douglas, McDonnell Douglas did lose its pride of place
because the Price Waterhouse approach comes first. Moreover, in
practical effect Price Waterhouse supplanted McDonnell Douglas because,
if the plaintiff wins on Price Waterhouse, the factfinder never gets to
McDonnell Douglas. In the alternative, if the plaintiff fails to convince
the factfinder that an impermissible factor, such as race or sex, played
a motivating part in the employer's decision, it is difficult to imagine the
factfinder then being convinced that the true reason for, or the single
source of, the employer's action was intentional discrimination under
McDonnell Douglas. That conclusion is especially true because, at the
time the Court decided Price Waterhouse, four of the courts of appeals
required the plaintiff to make the McDonnell Douglas showing to the
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 258.
[Vol. 51696
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"but-for" level,22 which is a much more arduous burden than the
"motivating factor" level of Price Waterhouse.
Justice Brennan failed in his attempt to restart individual disparate
treatment theory based on his new theory because his opinion carried
only three other Justices. To make a decision of the Court, it is
necessary to look to the concurring opinion of either Justice White or
Justice O'Connor. Both raised the bar for the plaintiff's initial showing.
Rather than the "motivating factor" test proposed by Justice Brennan,
they required the plaintiff to prove that the impermissible consideration
was a "substantial factor" in the employer's decision.23
22. Id. at 238 n.2. Seven of the courts of appeals required only that the plaintiff prove
"that a discriminatory motive was a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor." Id. Those courts
then divided on (1) the availability of the same decision defense when the defendant proved
that it would have taken the same action even if it had not considered the impermissible
factor, (2) the level of proof necessary to sustain that defense, and (3) the effect of the
defense as cutting off liability or only limiting remedies. Id.
23. Id. at 258 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at 261 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Delineating the actual differences among these standards is
daunting. It is clear that there is a spectrum among these articulations ranging from
something being the sole factor that explains the employer's action to something being
merely one of a number of motivating factors. At one extreme, when something is the sole
factor that explains the event, it is the only reason for it. In an employment termination
case under that standard, the employee who proves the employer discriminated
nevertheless loses unless she was perfect, because only then would the employer have had
no grounds other than discrimination.
A but-for standard means that factors other than discrimination could be involved but
the event would not have happened without the discriminatory factor. In an age case, the
court described the but-for test as asking the jury to decide "whether age accounts for the
decision-in other words, whether the same events would have transpired if the employee
had been younger than 40 and everything else had been the same." Gehring v. Case Corp.,
43 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 1994). There is a real difference between the sole and the but-
for tests. In Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F.3d 1204 (3d Cir. 1995), a case tried before
Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (overturning precedent that
imposed a sole factor test in age discrimination cases), the jury was given a "sole cause"
charge on the ADEA count but was given a but-for charge on a supplemental state law
count of age discrimination. Abrams, 50 F.3d at 1211. Reviewing the same evidence for
both counts, the jury found for the employer on the ADEA count but found for plaintiff on
the state law count. Id. While age was the but-for reason for defendant's action, plaintiff's
age was not the sole factor accounting for the employer's decision to terminate him. Id.
The next level is the "determinative factor" test. While there may be some nuanced
differences between this test and the but-for test, this test seems to carry virtually the
same connotation as the but-for test.
The substantial factor test, espoused by Justices O'Connor and White in Price
Waterhouse, involves a showing that is less significant than the but-for test. "Substantial"
connotes considerable, meaningful, or significant. In contrast, the motivating factor test
signifies less involvement than the substantial factor test. "Motivating factor" appears to
mean only that the protected characteristic was real and present to help explain the
HeinOnline  -- 51 Mercer L. Rev. 697 1999-2000
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Justice O'Connor added another, more significant obstacle to the use
of the new method. She would further require the plaintiff to rely on
direct evidence of discrimination to qualify for the lower threshold
showing to make out a prima facie case of discrimination.24 In nine-
teenth century evidence law, direct evidence was evidence that proved
a fact at issue without the need to draw an inference. While Justice
O'Connor did not exactly define the term, the statements of defendant's
decisionmakers that admitted using gender satisfied her notion of direct
evidence in Price Waterhouse.25 In dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, jumped at the chance of
limiting the effect of Price Waterhouse by describing the holding of the
case as being based on Justice O'Connor's, rather than Justice White's,
concurrence.
26
[T]he actual holding of today's decision ... [is] that in a limited
number of cases Title VII plaintiffs, by presenting direct and substan-
tial evidence of discriminatory animus, may shift the burden of
persuasion to the defendant to show that an adverse employment
decision would have been supported by legitimate reasons. The shift
in the burden of persuasion occurs only where a plaintiff proves by
direct evidence that an unlawful motive was a substantial factor
actually relied upon in making the decision. 27
As predicted by astute commentators,28 the lower courts generally
adopted Justice O'Connor's concurrence in the first round of decisions
after Price Waterhouse. What this meant was that McDonnell Douglas
survived as the primary way to analyze individual disparate treatment
cases because, as the dissent in Price Waterhouse indicated, there are
only a limited number of cases in which plaintiffs can produce the direct
evidence necessary to trigger the Price Waterhouse framework.29
This pride of place for McDonnell Douglas did not change immediately,
even after Congress amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
These amendments adopted Justice Brennan's motivating factor inquiry
and changed the effect of the defendant's proof of the same-decision
employer's decision, but such a factor need not be significant, much less determinative.
But see Glover v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 981 F.2d 388, 395 (8th Cir. 1992), vacated &
remanded, 510 U.S. 802 (1993) (equating substantial factor with motivating factor).
24. 490 U.S. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
25. Id. at 279.
26. Id. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. See Theodore Y. Blumoff & Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Reagan Court and Title VII:
A Common-Law Outlook on a Statutory Task, 49 N.C. L. REv. 1, 51 n.274 (1990).
29. 490 U.S. at 290-91 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 51698
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defense (i.e., that it would have made the same decision even if it had
not considered the impermissible factor), so that instead of cutting off
the defendant's liability, a same-decision showing now only limits the
plaintiff's remedies.3s Congress reduced the consequences of the proof
of the same-decision defense from a full defense to liability to a
restriction on the plaintiff's entitlement to full remedies. New section
706(g)(2)(B) now provides that once a plaintiff makes out her case under
section 703(m), if the defendant carries its burden of persuasion to prove
that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor," the plaintiff is allowed only limited
remedies."1 These include declaratory relief announcing that she was
the victim of the defendant's discrimination, an injunction against the
defendant's further discrimination, and "attorney's fees and costs
demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim
under section [703(m)]."32 Thus, if the defendant carries its burden, the
plaintiff is denied compensatory and punitive damages as well as
backpay, reinstatement, and other positive equitable relief.
In sum, Justice Brennan did not win the first round in his attempt to
supplant McDonnell Douglas with his new approach. The 1991
amendments to Title VII were not taken to change the fundamental
bifurcated structure of individual disparate treatment law, with Price
Waterhouse applicable in only a small subset of cases. The question is
whether, in the longer run that we may now be beginning to see in
recent decisions by the courts of appeals, some variant of the motivating
factor threshold, with the same-decision defense, may prevail over the
McDonnell Douglas approach as the primary method of analyzing
individual disparate treatment cases. The stage is perhaps being set for
the ultimate victory of Justice Brennan's approach, or something very
much like it.
II. THE COURTS OF APPEALS: ADRIFT OR FINDING A NEW PATH?
While several of the lower courts have continued to apply the Supreme
Court's bifurcated structure based on cases being analyzed under either
McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse, a number of them have been
moving away from that approach in three principal ways. However,
several courts of appeal have thus far stayed the course. For example,
30. New section 703(m) provides that "an unlawful employment practice is established
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m).
31. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
32. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
20001 699
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the Fourth Circuit continues to use the classic definition of direct
evidence-evidence proving the fact at issue without the need to draw
any inferences-as the threshold showing necessary to trigger Price
Waterhouse.33 Further, McDonnell Douglas is the default approach if
Price Waterhouse is found not to apply; thus, most cases are treated as
McDonnell Douglas cases. 4 Finally, the Fourth Circuit has rejected
the idea that the 1991 amendments apply to McDonnell Douglas as well
as Price Waterhouse cases.3" Similarly, the Seventh Circuit defines
direct evidence quite narrowly.36
Among those courts that have moved away from the Supreme Court's
approach, three different paths have emerged. The first path is that of
the Fifth Circuit, which appears to have effectively abrogated McDonnell
Douglas so that all cases must proceed under Price Waterhouse, with the
plaintiff required to introduce direct evidence of discriminatory intent to
recover.3" Reeves involved evidence that one of the decisionmakers in
plaintiff's termination had several months previously described plaintiff
as so old that he "must have come over on the Mayflower," and that he
was "too damn old to do the job."3" Nevertheless, the trial court sent the
case to the jury under McDonnell Douglas, not Price Waterhouse.39 On
appeal of the jury verdict for plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit found that these
same statements were insufficient to satisfy its pretext-plus requirement
under McDonnell Douglas.4o
Despite the potentially damning nature of Chesnut's age-related
comments, it is clear that these comments were not made in the direct
context of Reeves's termination. In addition, Chesnut was just one of
three individuals who recommended to Ms. Sanderson [the company
president] that Reeves be terminated, and there is no evidence to
suggest that any of the other decision makers were motivated by age.
In fact, the record shows that at least two of the decision makers were
themselves over the age of 50-Ms. Sanderson at 52, and Jester at 56.
Furthermore, the fact remains that, as a result of the 1995 investiga-
33. See Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit's
definition of direct evidence may actually be narrower than what Justice O'Connor had in
mind in Price Waterhouse.
34. Id. at 1141-44.
35. Id. at 1142.
36. See Indurante v. Local 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 160 F.3d 364, 367 (7th Cir.
1998).
37. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 444 (1999) (No. 99-536).
38. Id. at 691.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 693.
700 [Vol. 51
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tion, each of the three Hinge Room supervisors was accused of
inaccurate record keeping, including not only Reeves and Caldwell, but
35 year old Oswalt as well. Finally, there is evidence that, at the time
Reeves was dismissed, 20 of the company's management positions were
filled by people over the age of 50, including several employees in their
late 60's.41
Reeves means that if the plaintiff cannot successfully argue that evidence
in the record satisfies the direct evidence threshold required for use of
Price Waterhouse, then the plaintiff is not going to be able to satisfy the
pretext-plus requirement that the Fifth Circuit has imposed on the
McDonnell Douglas approach. This is so even if the plaintiff is
successful, as he was in Reeves, in proving that the employer's reason for
its action was not true. In essence, to be successful in the Fifth Circuit,
all individual disparate treatment cases must involve direct evidence of
discriminatory state of mind.
Like the Fifth Circuit's approach in Reeves, two other paths appear to
be moving away from McDonnell Douglas, but, unlike the path taken by
the Fifth Circuit, these paths are moving toward a more proplaintiff
posture. The second path that some courts have taken merely expands
the threshold definition of direct evidence to allow for a broader
potential application of Price Waterhouse while otherwise maintaining
the bifurcated structure of analyzing all individual disparate treatment
cases as either McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse cases. Depend-
ing on how wide that threshold is, more and more individual disparate
treatment cases may be analyzed using Price Waterhouse. Though it has
now made a more radical change in approach that will be looked at
below,42 the Second Circuit was the first to expand the definition of
direct evidence to include some circumstantial evidence as long as that
evidence is tied directly to the alleged discrimination against the
plaintiff.43  This circumstantial-plus approach excludes statistical
evidence and evidence of discriminatory statements by the defendant's
agents if they are "'stray' remarks," that is, not sufficiently tied to the
decision the plaintiff challenges to shed light on the intention of the
employer when it made that decision.44 The Third Circuit adopted the
Second Circuit's approach in Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp.4" Otherwise, the
Third Circuit has since maintained the bifurcated structure, allowing for
41. Id. at 693-94.
42. See infra text accompanying notes 53-54.
43. Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co., 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992).
44. Id.
45. 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA
Corp., 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc).
20001
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only a small subset of cases to be analyzed under Price Waterhouse.
After the 1991 amendments, a plaintiff in the Third Circuit with the
appropriate circumstantial-plus evidence to trigger the use of Price
Waterhouse need only prove that a protected characteristic was a
motivating factor to establish liability, subject to the affirmative defense
limiting full remedies.46 In McDonnell Douglas cases, a plaintiff still
must prove that the protected characteristic was a determinative
influence in the employer's decision.47
While continuing to require direct evidence as a threshold to the
application of Price Waterhouse, the District of Columbia Circuit has
defined direct evidence in a way that appears slightly broader than
Ostrowski and Griffiths. In Thomas v. National Football League Players
Ass'n,48 the court described direct evidence as evidence "relat[ing] to the
question of discrimination in the particular employment decision, not to
the existence of other, potentially unrelated, forms of discrimination in
the workplace."49 Thus, in a discharge case, all evidence concerning
discharges would be direct, while, for example, evidence about failures
to hire or promote would not.
Finally, an even broader approach to the use of direct evidence to set
the scope of the application of Price Waterhouse comes from the Eighth
Circuit. In Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,5° the court found that
plaintiff had introduced direct evidence of pregnancy discrimination
when she showed that her supervisor, who knew she was pregnant,
required her to bring a doctor's note before he would let her return to
work from a layoff.51 Despite the fact that the supervisor made no
explicit reference to the fact that she was pregnant or that he was
requiring the note because she was pregnant, the court found this
conduct to be direct evidence because such notes were not required of
employees coming back from a layoff who were not pregnant.52 Thus,
evidence of different treatment was characterized as direct evidence,
thereby entitling plaintiff to rely on Price Waterhouse.
If all evidence of any different treatment is characterized as direct
evidence, then the definition of direct evidence becomes so broad that it
encompasses most individual disparate treatment cases. As a result,
McDonnell Douglas will lose its place as the approach governing most
46. Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 471.
47. Miller, 47 F.3d at 598.
48. 131 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
49. Id. at 204.
50. 132 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 1998).
51. Id. at 436.
52. Id.
702 (Vol. 51
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individual disparate treatment cases. Most cases will be analyzed under
Price Waterhouse, leaving McDonnell Douglas applicable to only a small
subset of individual disparate treatment cases that lack evidence that
can be characterized as direct. Deneen may be a step towards radically
changing the proportion of Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas
cases, if not requiring that all cases be decided under Price Waterhouse.
The third path several courts have begun to take undermines the
distinction between Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas by
applying the Price Waterhouse motivating factor threshold to all
individual disparate treatment discrimination cases. While holding to
its definition of circumstantial-plus evidence as the threshold to the
application of the Price Waterhouse approach, the Second Circuit, in
Fields v. New York State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental
Disabilities," held that the motivating factor level of showing made out
a prima facie case for both Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas
cases.54 Thus, both McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse continue
to exist, but an important distinction between the two kinds of cases,
that the plaintiff need prove that the impermissible factor was the
determinative one in McDonnell Douglas cases while she need only prove
it to be a motivating factor in Price Waterhouse cases, has been
eliminated. The only remaining difference between the two types of
cases is that the same-decision defense to full remedies created by
section 706(g)(2)(B) applies to Price Waterhouse cases but does not apply
to McDonnell Douglas cases. Because the comparatively easy motivating
factor level is all that a plaintiff in the Second Circuit need prove under
either McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse, a plaintiff will always
argue that the circumstantial evidence approach of McDonnell Douglas
applies to avoid the same-decision defense. Under Fields defendants will
now argue that every case involves direct evidence so that they can at
least try to prove the same-decision affirmative defense to escape
liability for full remedies.
Fields effectively turns Justice O'Connor's approach in Price Water-
house on its head. While it is likely that most cases will still be treated
as McDonnell Douglas cases and that only a small subset will be treated
as Price Waterhouse cases, the operation of this will now be profoundly
proplaintiff, which is just the opposite of the prodefendant result
contemplated by Justice O'Connor and the dissenters in Price Water-
house.
At least one judge of the Eleventh Circuit has gone even further than
Fields by eliminating McDonnell Douglas as a way for factfinders to
53. 115 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 1997).
54. Id. at 121.
20001 703
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analyze cases. This approach all but eliminates the bifurcated approach
to analyzing individual disparate treatment cases by adopting the Price
Waterhouse analysis for deciding all individual disparate treatment
cases. All that is left of McDonnell Douglas under this approach is its
use procedurally to create a rebuttable presumption of liability against
the defendant to find evidence of the nondiscriminatory reason that the
employer claims motivated the decision that the plaintiff challenges.
Having fulfilled that role when the employer produces evidence of its
alleged nondiscriminatory reason, McDonnell Douglas drops completely
out of the case before it goes to the factfinder. In Wright v. Southland
Corp.,"5 Judge Tjoflat, with whom the other two judges concurred only
in the result, proposed a new way of analyzing all individual disparate
treatment cases.56 He would require direct evidence in every individual
disparate treatment case, but he defined direct evidence simply as
evidence sufficient to satisfy the preponderance of evidence test:
"'[Dlirect evidence,' in the context of employment discrimination law,
means evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find, more
probably than not, a causal link between an adverse employment action
and a protected personal characteristic."57
55. 187 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 1300-02.
57. Id. at 1293. This test resembles a number of the approaches suggested by some of
the critics of McDonnell Douglas. For example, Professor Linda Hamilton Krieger proposes
a test that "a Title VII plaintiff would simply be required to prove that his group status
played a role in causing the employer's action or decision." Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1242 (1995). Professor Kenneth R. Davis
would adopt the motivating factor test under which "[tihe jury would decide whether the
plaintiff has proven that illegal discrimination motivated the adverse employment decision.
The defendant would then have the opportunity to limit the remedy by proving that it
would have taken the same action based on a legitimate reason." Davis, supra note 11, at
761. A careful application of the traditional civil procedure approach has been proposed
by Judge Denny Chin and Jodi Golinsky:
The best approach is perhaps the most basic one: first, evaluating plaintiffs
proof, direct or otherwise, of discrimination; second, evaluating defendant's proof
that it did not discriminate, including evidence of defendant's explanation for its
employment decision; and third, evaluating the evidence as a whole. Courts
should focus on the "ultimate issue" of whether the plaintiff has proven that it is
more likely than not that the employer's decision was motivated at least in part
by an impermissible or discriminatory reason. In a summary judgment context
or on a motion for judgment as a matter of law following a verdict for the plaintiff,
the court must evaluate the evidence as a whole resolving all conflicts in the proof
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method
forAssessing Evidence in Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659,673 (1998) (footnote
omitted). Another approach would not articulate the issue as one of causation but
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Judge Tjoflat distinguished this preponderance definition of direct
evidence from what he called the dictionary definition of direct
evidence-"'evidence, which if believed, proves existence of fact in issue
without inference or presumption.'" 8 The dictionary definition of direct
evidence is inadequate when the issue is intent to discriminate because
the only evidence that would satisfy that test "would be testimony from
the decisionmaker that he took an adverse employment action against
the plaintiff on the basis of a protected personal characteristic."59
Using his analysis to review all the prior decisions of the Eleventh
Circuit, Judge Tjoflat found that none of the cases that found direct
evidence of discrimination present in the record satisfied the stringent
dictionary definition of direct evidence. 0 All the prior cases in which
liability was found based on direct evidence, however, did satisfy his
preponderance definition of direct evidence."'
This new preponderance definition of direct evidence applies to what
had been both Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas cases. The role
otherwise is quite similar to Judge Tjoflat's approach in Wright. Professor Mary Ellen
Maatman analyzes Price Waterhouse, Hazen Paper, and Hicks from the perspective of
rhetoric and points to their underlying common thread of a prerealist search for "pure"
causation that cannot be attained. Mary Ellen Maatman, Choosing Words and Creating
Worlds: The Supreme Court's Rhetoric and its Constitutive Effects on Employment
Discrimination Law, 60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 12-48, 64-88 (1998). She suggests that the link
between the plaintiff and the employer's action be based on the nature of the injury to the
plaintiff, which is the approach associated with contemporary views of causation in torts.
Id.
I have earlier argued that the effect of the 1991 amendments was to collapse McDonnell
Douglas into Price Waterhouse. Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of
Disparate Treatment Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 600-21 (1996). In that
article I argued that the plain language of the new statute does not distinguish between
circumstantial and direct evidence cases and that a straightforward application of the
statutory language would eliminate much of the sterile confusion that has emerged in
debating the McDonnell Douglas approach:
In sum, new sections 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) apply to all individual disparate
treatment cases brought under Title VII. Because all evidence of discrimination
is circumstantial, courts should not attempt to categorize such evidence as direct
or circumstantial. All relevant evidence, that is, evidence that is material and
probative, should be equally weighed by the factfinder in determining whether the
employer discriminated.
Id. at 621.
58. 187 F.3d at 1293 (quoting BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 460 (6th ed. 1990)).
59. Id. at 1295. Early on, Professor Charles A. Sullivan made the point that what
Justice O'Connor was really talking about was not direct evidence but instead admissions
of a party against its interest. Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse:
Proving Disparate Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107, 1131 (1991).
60. 187 F.3d at 1298.
61. Id.
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of McDonnell Douglas is diminished from its role as the primary method
for analyzing individual disparate treatment cases to a procedural role
to aid the plaintiff by creating a rebuttable presumption of liability to
force the employer to come forward with the nondiscriminatory reason
it claims justified its decision. 2 Once that reason is known (whether
or not because of the application of McDonnell Douglas), McDonnell
Douglas drops completely out of the case because "the elements needed
to establish the McDonnell Douglas presumption, standing alone, are not
sufficient to prove that the plaintiff, more probably than not, was a
victim of illegal discrimination." 3 Thus, the preponderance definition
of direct evidence applies in all individual disparate treatment cases,
and the determination of whether it is satisfied is made based on all the
evidence-the McDonnell Douglas elements, the employer's asserted
reason, evidence that the reason is a pretext, dictionary direct evidence,
and all the other evidence in the record. In essence, direct evidence
simply becomes all the circumstantial evidence admitted to prove
discrimination, leaving nothing of the dichotomy between direct and
circumstantial evidence or the dichotomy between Price Waterhouse and
McDonnell Douglas when the case goes to the factfinder.
That nothing is left for McDonnell Douglas to do once the case goes to
the factfinder is clear from the fact that the Price Waterhouse affirmative
defense, as modified by the 1991 amendments, applies in all individual
disparate treatment cases. Thus, if the plaintiff proves that discrimina-
tion was a motivating factor pursuant to this preponderance of the
evidence standard, "the defendant can nevertheless prevail by showing
that the same employment decision would have been made absent the
discriminatory motive." 4 In an accompanying footnote, Judge Tjoflat
described the effect of the 1991 amendments: "In Title VII cases, this
showing [of the same-decision defense] serves only to limit the liability
62. Judge Denny Chin found that, in his review of the reported cases, the defendant
never failed to come forward with evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the decision
that the plaintiff challenged as discriminatory. Chin & Golinsky, supra note 38, at 665.
63. 187 F.3d at 1292. This takes up a point made by Professor Deborah C. Malamud.
She traced the Supreme Court's individual disparate treatment cases and concluded that
"the Supreme Court never succeeded in setting the prima facie case threshold high enough
to permit the proven prima facie case to support a sufficiently strong inference of
discrimination to mandate judgment for the plaintif." Malamud, supra note 11, at 2236-37.
If that is true, then McDonnell Douglas is not really a way for the factfinder to analyze
cases. The holding, however, can be preserved by allowing it to play the procedural role
delineated by Judge Tjoflat.
64. 187 F.3d at 1302-03.
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of the employer; it does not relieve the employer of liability altogeth-
er."
65
In sum, the law of individual disparate treatment discrimination
appears to be moving away from the bifurcated approach established by
the Supreme Court and toward a unified approach, at least in Title VII
cases, based on the plaintiff's proof that an impermissible reason was a
motivating factor in the challenged decision, with the prima facie
showing subject to the same-decision affirmative defense to full
remedies. Some courts are doing this simply by expanding the definition
of direct evidence to expand the scope of application of the Price
Waterhouse approach. The Second Circuit in Fields has virtually
collapsed McDonnell Douglas into Price Waterhouse, at least for purposes
of establishing liability if the plaintiff can prove that a protected
characteristic was a motivating factor in the employer's decision. By
maintaining the same-decision defense in Price Waterhouse cases but not
applying it in McDonnell Douglas cases, the Second Circuit has
fundamentally reversed the dynamics in individual disparate treatment
cases. Finally, at least one judge has relegated McDonnell Douglas to
a procedural role to be used to induce the defendant to come forth with
evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the action the plaintiff
challenges. Once evidence of that reason is in the record, the case is
analyzed by the factfinder using Price Waterhouse. Thus, Justice
Brennan's approach in Price Waterhouse, as modified by the 1991
amendments to Title VII, may yet carry the day. McDonnell Douglas
may be losing its position as the approach by which most individual
disparate treatment cases are analyzed. The next part of this Article
deals with the special problem of proving individual disparate treatment
under the ADEA.
III. INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT AND THE ADEA
A. The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence
Until the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Supreme
Court's 1993 decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,66 the courts
approached individual disparate treatment cases of age discrimination
the same way as they approached Title VII cases. Indeed, at a broad
level, the Supreme Court acknowledged a uniform approach to the
antidiscrimination statutes. For example, in Trans World Airlines v.
65. Id. at 1303 n.17.
66. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
20001 707
HeinOnline  -- 51 Mercer L. Rev. 707 1999-2000
MERCER LAW REVIEW
Thurston,7 the Court relied on Title VII authority in an ADEA case,
stating that the "interpretation of Title VII... applies with equal force
in the context of age discrimination."6 8
In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, however, the amendments that Congress
made concerning individual disparate treatment discrimination were
made to Title VII and not to the ADEA or other antidiscrimination
statutes. This created the possibility that approaches to individual
disparate treatment cases would diverge from the prior uniform model,
with Title VII cases determined by the 1991 amendments, but cases
brought under the ADEA analyzed based on pre-existing law.
The 1993 decision in Hazen Paper, which involved facts that arose
before the effective date of the 1991 amendments to Title VII, added its
own set of problems. On the one hand, the Court repeatedly cited Title
VII cases along with ADEA cases in describing individual disparate
treatment discrimination and did not distinguish the approaches by
statutory source of the claim. That supports the idea that there
continues to be a uniform approach to individual disparate treatment
cases across the different federal antidiscrimination statutes. On the
other hand, Justice O'Connor set forth an enigmatic description of
disparate treatment that can be construed as being at odds with the
approach Congress took to Title VII cases in the 1991 amendments:
"Whatever the employer's decisionmaking process, a disparate treatment
claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually
played a role in that process and had a determinative influence on the
outcome." 9 The language is enigmatic because it does not indicate
which party carries what burden of proof when litigating the issue of
whether the employee's protected trait actually played a role and had a
determinative influence in the employer's decision. While skeptical that
"determinative" means plaintiffs must negate a same-decision showing,
Professor Harold Lewis assumes, not implausibly, that the Court intends
for them to prove both that age played a role and that it had a
67. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
68. Id. at 121. The Supreme Court also adopted McDonnell Douglas in section 1981
cases. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Court said: "We
have developed, in analogous areas of civil rights law, a carefully designed framework of
proof to determine, in the context of disparate treatment, the ultimate issue whether the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff.... [Tihis scheme of proof...
should apply to claims of racial discrimination under § 1981." Id. at 186 (citations
omitted).
69. 507 U.S. at 610.
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determinative influence (whatever that means) in the decisions they
challenge. °
In contrast, I have earlier taken a different approach based on
aligning Justice O'Connor's Hazen Paper language with the burden-
shifting approach of the 1991 amendments. 71 This is possible because
the language used by Justice O'Connor appears to be easily divisible into
two separate parts: first, that "the employee's protected trait actually
played a role," and; second, that the protected trait "had a determinative
influence on the outcome."72 While under section 703(m) the plaintiff
bears the burden of proving that a protected trait was a motivating
factor in the challenged decision, that language is not very different in
meaning from Justice O'Connor's requirement that a protected trait
must have actually played a role in the challenged decision. When a
plaintiff proves that a protected trait in fact was a motivating factor,
then section 706(g)(2)(B) shifts the burden of persuasion to the
defendant to prove that it "would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor."73 If the defendant is
successful in carrying that burden, then the protected trait, in the
language of Justice O'Connor in Biggins, did not have "a determinative
influence on the outcome" because of the fact that an impermissible
factor motivated the employer made no difference, much less a determi-
native difference, in what happened to the plaintiff. If the defendant
fails to carry its burden, then, again quoting Justice O'Connor, it is
reasonable to conclude that the protected trait arguably did have "a
determinative influence on the outcome." That conclusion is based on
the fact that we know that the employer was motivated by the impermis-
sible factor and, given the defendant's failure to prove that the
impermissible factor made no difference in how the plaintiff was treated,
it is reasonable to conclude that this factor did make the difference in
how the plaintiff was treated. In short, in Hazen Paper Justice
O'Connor seemed to anticipate the two-step analysis established in the
1991 Act.
7 4
It is also instructive that Justice O'Connor's two-part division in
Hazen Paper evokes the approach she earlier took in Price Waterhouse
of allocating shifting burdens of proof to the plaintiff and the defendant
70. 1 HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, LITIGATING CIVIL RIGHTS AND
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES § 9.5 (2d ed. 1999).
71. Zimmer, supra note 57, at 586-88.
72. 507 U.S. at 610.
73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
74. Zimmer, supra note 57, at 588.
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while ultimately maintaining a but-for standard for connecting the
defendant's action to the plaintiffs harm.
Where a disparate treatment plaintiff has made such a showing [that
an illegitimate factor played a substantial role in the employment
decision], the burden then rests with the employer to convince the trier
of fact that it is more likely than not that the decision would have been
the same absent consideration of the illegitimate factor .... If the
employer fails to carry this burden, the factfinder is justified in
concluding that the decision was made "because of" consideration of the
illegitimate factor and the substantive [but-for] standard for liability
under the statute is satisfied.75
Thus, Hazen Paper is not inconsistent with the idea that the approach
to age discrimination cases should be the same as in Title VII cases."6
B. The Lower Courts' Jurisprudence
There is not much real authority in the lower courts actually applying
the same-decision defense in an ADEA case since Congress enacted the
1991 amendments to Title VII. This is perhaps because the courts have
been strict in patrolling the boundary between McDonnell Douglas and
Price Waterhouse and have not found ageist statements, even by
decisionmakers, to meet the threshold test of direct evidence necessary
75. 490 U.S. at 276-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
76. Since Hazen Paper the Supreme Court has decided another individual disparate
treatment case of age discrimination. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
517 U.S. 308 (1996). Like Hazen Paper it is somewhat ambiguous in impact. The question
presented was whether there was a safe harbor from age discrimination cases involving
terminations because plaintiffs replacement was also within the over-age-40 group
protected by the ADEA. Id. at 309. The circuit court viewed it as a McDonnell Douglas
case. Id. at 310. In an aside, Justice Scalia appeared to invite someone to argue that
McDonnell Douglas was not available in age discrimination cases: "We have never had
occasion to decide whether that application of the Title VII rule [of McDonnell Douglas] to
the ADEA context is correct, but since the parties do not contest that point, we shall
assume it." Id. at 311. That statement is somewhat enigmatic because it could mean that
the Court might decide that McDonnell Douglas would apply to Title VII cases but not to
ADEA cases. Another possibility is that McDonnell Douglas does not apply in ADEA cases
because it has been overruled for Title VII purposes as well. Nevertheless, because the
Court in O'Connor did go on to construe McDonnell Douglas, it is difficult to know what
that statement means in the longer run.
The Supreme Court has recently decided to hear another individual disparate treatment
case of age discrimination. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 180 F.3d 263
(5th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 444 (1999) (No. 99-
536). Reeves is discussed supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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for the application of Price Waterhouse." The lack of direct evidence
of discrimination prevents cases from ever getting to the stage at which
the same-decision defense could apply. There is, however, some dicta in
several cases, including two Eighth Circuit decisions, that say the 1991
amendments to Title VII apply in age discrimination cases."8 In
Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., for example, the court equated
the analysis applicable to age and sex discrimination cases and indicated
that the effect of a successful same-decision defense was to limit
remedies, not to cut off liability.79
Ms. Breeding first contends that she has made out a submissible
case of sex and age discrimination under ... Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins .. . . "When a plaintiff puts forth direct evidence that an
illegal criterion, such as age [or sex], was used in the employer's
decision to terminate the plaintiff," we apply the standards enunciated
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, as modified by § 107 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). Fast v. Southern Union Co.,
149 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 1998). Under this modified Price Water-
house standard, a defendant is liable for discrimination upon proof by
direct evidence that an employer acted on the basis of a discriminatory
motive, and proof that the employer would have made the same
decision absent the discriminatory motive is only relevant to determin-
ing the appropriate remedy.'
There is also dicta in several cases cutting the other way. In a footnote
in Miller v. CIGNA Corp.,s' the Third Circuit, in justifying its reliance
on Title VII authority in an age discrimination case arising before the
effective date of the 1991 amendments, suggested that those amend-
ments created a divergent path for Title VII and ADEA cases:
77. For a good example, see Reeves discussed supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
See also Cox v. Dubuque Bank & Trust Co., 163 F.3d 492, 497 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that
an employer has the right to ask an older employee about retirement plans); Philipp v.
ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 61 F.3d 669, 674 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that references by the
decisionmaker to plaintiff as "the old man" plus many age-related statements by
nondecisionmakers were insufficient to establish direct evidence threshold); Mooney v.
Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1218 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that age-related statements
by plaintiffs supervisor did not constitute direct evidence because they primarily indicated
a desire to employ lower-paid employees); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 779
(3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the Price Waterhouse threshold was not satisfied when a
company official said the company could not afford to keep people over fifty and fifty,
meaning employees over age 50 who made at least $50,000 per year).
78. See Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156 (8th Cir. 1999);
Fast v. Southern Union Co., 149 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 1998).
79. 164 F.3d at 1160.
80. Id. at 1156 (citations omitted) (alteration in original).
81. 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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In the course of this opinion, we have relied on Title VII cases
because the development of the relevant case law under the two
statutes prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 followed parallel courses
.... The substantive provisions of the 1991 Act that amended Title
VII did not amend the ADEA, and Miller does not contend that [the
1991 amendments are] applicable to ADEA cases. 2
It appears likely that the Third Circuit would maintain the bifurcated
structure of separate McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse
approaches in age discrimination cases, with the but-for level of showing
for McDonnell Douglas cases and the motivating factor level for Price
Waterhouse cases, and the same-decision defense limited to Price
Waterhouse cases.
As indicated above, Judge Tjoflat, in Wright v. Southland Corp.,
suggested a modified approach that would leave the threshold showing
of the motivating factor test for age discrimination cases but provided for
the same-decision defense to have the effect that it had in Price
Waterhouse of cutting off liability and not merely limiting damages.8 3
He then suggests that the threshold showing required of the plaintiff is
the same in cases brought under the ADEA and section 1981, but a
successful same-decision showing by the defendant operates as a
complete defense to liability under those statutes rather than as a
limitation on remedies.8 4 Thus, Judge Tjoflat's approach maintains the
uniform structure of individual disparate treatment law to the extent of
applying the same motivating factor threshold to cases brought under all
antidiscrimination statutes, including Title VII and the ADEA. He then
deviates from this uniform structure with regard to the consequences of
the successful assertion of the same-decision defense. Thus, when the
ADEA defendant carries its burden of proving that it would have made
the same decision even absent consideration of the plaintiff's age, the
plaintiff loses completely.
While plausible, this approach is not necessary. In the development
of the federal common law85 of disparate treatment discrimination
under all the federal antidiscrimination statutes, the courts can look to
particular provisions of a statute for approaches that best implement the
82. Id. at 598 n.10.
83. 187 F.3d at 1303 n.17 ("In Title VII cases, this showing [of the same-decision
defense] serves only to limit the liability of the employer; it does not relieve the employer
of liability altogether.").
84. Id. ("In other areas of employment discrimination law, however, this showing is a
complete defense.").
85. See David E. Seidelson, Federal Common Law: Whose Baby Are You?, 5 WIDENER
J. PUB. L. 365 (1996).
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national policy against discrimination. So far the Supreme Court has
found a uniform approach to interpreting the different antidiscrimina-
tion statutes to be appropriate in carrying forth the will of Congress.
While Congress did not amend the ADEA, or the other antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, when it added sections 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B) to Title
VII, it is clear that Congress took no steps to foreclose the courts from
relying on those provisions in interpreting the ADEA and the other
federal antidiscrimination statutes.
Beyond the value of uniformity in approach, there are good reasons to
move toward the Price Waterhouse approach, as modified by the 1991
amendments, in age discrimination cases. First, McDonnell Douglas
appears to have run its course. Especially since the 1993 decisions in
Hazen Paper and Hicks, there has been a torrent of criticism of what has
become of the McDonnell Douglas approach."6 Also, as discussed
above, 7 most of the courts of appeals have been moving away from its
use. Second, the problem that initially justified McDonnell Douglas, that
much discrimination will go unremedied if plaintiffs are required to find
and introduce direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory state of
mind, persists. Third, the modified Price Waterhouse approach, allowing
all individual disparate treatment cases, whether based on direct or
circumstantial evidence, to be analyzed under the motivating factor
threshold, takes account of the difficulty plaintiffs have in finding direct
evidence of discrimination but also protects defendants from the
unwarranted imposition of all remedies by providing the same-decision
defense to full remedies.8 " Finally, no aspect of age discrimination
appears to warrant a different approach from the one applicable to race,
gender, religion, and national origin discrimination under Title VII.
In sum, the full implementation of all the federal antidiscrimination
laws would be better achieved by adopting, as a uniform approach for all
individual disparate treatment cases, the approach that would allow the
plaintiff to establish the defendant's liability by carrying the burden of
proving that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor of the
challenged employment decision. 9 If the plaintiff carries that burden,
86. See supra note 11.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 37-65.
88. When the plaintiffs case is strong, it is difficult for the defendant to convince the
factfinder that it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered the
impermissible factor. When the plaintiff has a weak case but nevertheless convinces the
factfinder that the impermissible factor was a motivating factor in the employer's decision,
the defendant will typically have a strong case that it would have made the same decision
even in absence of the impermissible factor.
89. McDonnell Douglas would still be available before the case goes to the factfinder
to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination until the defendant produces evidence
20001
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then the defendant has the opportunity to carry as an affirmative
defense the burden of proving that it would have made the same decision
in the absence of the impermissible factor. If the defendant is success-
ful, then the plaintiff would be entitled only to limited remedies. If the
defendant fails to prove that it would have made the same decision even
if it would not have considered the impermissible factor, then the
plaintiff would be entitled to full relief under the antidiscrimination
statute she relied on in bringing her action. Thus, Justice Brennan
should triumph even at this late date.
IV. ADEA REMEDIES IN SAME-DECISION DEFENSE CASES
The basic remedy structure available in ADEA actions is similar but
not identical to the remedies available under Title VII. In ADEA actions
brought by individuals, section 626(b) provides broad remedies but does
so by looking to the Fair Labor Standards Act." A backpay award in
Title VII is called a claim for unpaid wages under the ADEA, but they
are basically the same.91 The difference is that the ADEA does not
provide for compensatory or punitive damages, which are now available
under Title VII. The ADEA, however, does provide for liquidated
damages in an amount equal to the amount of the unpaid wages award
if the violation by the defendant was willful.92 Like Title VII, the
ADEA provides that "[in any action.., the court shall have jurisdiction
to grant such ... equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the
purposes of this chapter, including without limitation judgments
compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion."93
So, what happens when a defendant is successful in asserting the
same-decision defense? Under Title VII, it is clear that the specific
provisions of section 706(g)(2)(B) apply. Section 706(g)(2)(B) provides
that the court:
of the nondiscriminatory reason it claims motivated the decision the plaintiff challenges.
90. That section provides: "The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in
accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216
(except for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title [the Fair Labor Standards Act], and
subsection (c) of this section." 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b).
91. CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 20.8 (2d ed. 1988).
The ADEA also provides: "Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this
chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation
for purposes of sections 216 and 217 of this title." 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b).
92. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b). This section provides "[tihat liquidated damages shall be
payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter." Id.
93. Id.
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(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided
in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section [703(m)] ...;
and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in
subparagraph (A).'
The declaratory relief available to the plaintiff is simply a court
declaration that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff. While
not automatic, injunctive relief is available in individual disparate
treatment cases so courts can "enjoin[] defendants from discriminating
or retaliating in the future against the named plaintiffs."5 With
regard to declaratory and injunctive relief, the limitations on remedies
in cases involving the same-decision defense would not seem to pose any
difficult problems in an ADEA action because the remedies are so
similar to those available under Title VII.
The remedy that may raise a more substantial question of statutory
interpretation concerns attorney fees. Here the differences in language
between the two statutes might make a difference in outcome. The
general provision for attorney fees in Title VII is based on section 706(k),
which reads, "In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable
attorney's fee (including expert fees) as part of the costs."9" But section
706(g)(2)(B) appears to create a specific standard for attorney fees in
same-decision defense cases. When the plaintiff has prevailed in
establishing the defendant's liability by proving the defendant relied on
an impermissible motivating factor, but the defendant successfully
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). Subparagraph (A) refers to section 706(g)(2)(A),
which provides:
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an
individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or promotion of
an individual as an employee, or the payment to him of any back pay, if such
individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused
employment or advancement or was suspended or discharged for any reason other
than discrimination on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or in
violation of section [704(a)].
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A).
95. BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1745-
46 (3d ed. 1996). Some courts have denied injunctive relief when the plaintiff proved only
an isolated instance of discrimination. See, e.g., Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651,
660-61 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
Others have issued injunctions in cases involving only isolated instances of discrimination.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Gurnee Inn Corp., 914 F.2d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 1990).
96. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k).
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proves its same-decision defense, the court "may grant ... attorney's fees
and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of
a claim under section [703(m)] [thereby proving that an impermissible
factor was a motivating factor in the decision plaintiff challenges]."97
There is no comparable provision in the ADEA that focuses on
attorney fees in the same-decision defense situation. The provision of
the FLSA that the ADEA incorporates as to attorney fees for all age
discrimination cases differs from the general Title VII standard of
section 706(k) because it does not focus on who the prevailing party was.
It also differs from the special standard of section 706(g)(2)(B) that
applies in the same-decision defense situation because the FLSA
provision appears to mandate attorney fees whenever plaintiffs prevail,
with no discretion in the trial court to deny those fees.9" Thus, the
FLSA provides, "The court in such action shall, in addition to any
judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable
attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action."99
The question is whether, in a same-decision defense case, the
discretionary standard that applies in Title VII cases ought to be read
into the ADEA in same-decision defense cases arising under that statute.
Generally, it would not seem to make much difference because the range
of discretion allowed trial courts in Title VII cases to deny attorney fees
to prevailing plaintiffs is limited to a narrow set of special circumstanc-
es.1 °0 However, relying on the word "may," several courts have denied
attorney fees in same-decision defense cases brought under Title VII
because any amount of attorney fees would not be proportionate to the
minimal relief the plaintiff otherwise received. For example, in
Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Center, Inc.,' 1o plaintiff proved that her
pregnancy was a motivating factor for the employer's decision to lay her
off, but defendant carried its burden of proving that it would have laid
her off in any case for nondiscriminatory reasons. °2 Taking its cue
from and expanding upon the Supreme Court's decision in Farrar v.
Hobby, °3 the court relied on the word "may" in section 706(g)(2)(B) to
97. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
98. Hagelthorn v. Kennecott Corp., 710 F.2d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 1983).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (emphasis added).
100. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 95, at 1866-70.
101. 88 F.3d 1332 (4th Cir. 1996).
102. Id. at 1333.
103. 506 U.S. 103, 112-15 (1992) (holding that "a plaintiff who wins [only] nominal
damages is a prevailing party under [42 U.S.C.] § 1988," but that because of proportionality
the plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney fees).
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require proportionality analysis in same-decision defense cases, even
though plaintiff was, pursuant to section 703(m), a prevailing party.10 4
Sheppard is an improper interpretation of Title VII's same-decision
defense provisions. While section 706(g)(2)(B) grants the trial court
some discretion, Congress, in differentiating the relief that is available
from that which is not, itself engaged in the proportionality analysis that
the Sheppard court held is to be applied by the trial judge on a case by
case basis. First, Congress made it clear in section 703(m) that "an
unlawful employment practice is established" when the plaintiff proves
that the defendant relied on an impermissible motivating factor in
making the decision that is being challenged.'0 5 Second, when the
defendant fails to prove the same-decision defense, the plaintiff is
entitled to full remedies under the general remedial provisions of section
706(g).' 06 Third, if the defendant proves that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not considered the impermissible factor,
section 706(g)(2)(B) determines that the prevailing plaintiff receives only
limited remedies, including limited declaratory and injunctive relief and
"attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only
to the pursuit of a claim under section [703(m)]." °7 That structure
establishes the proportionality of the attorney fee award in cases brought
under section 703(m), whether the same-decision defense created in
section 706(g)(2)(B) is proven or whether it fails.
Imposing another round of proportionality on top of the proportionality
that Congress determined in passing sections 703(m) and 706(g)(2)(B)
risks making those provisions superfluous. Section 706(g)(2)(B)(ii)
provides that, when the defendant successfully asserts the same-decision
defense, the court "shall not award damages or issue an order requiring
any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment [of
backpay." l5 The unavailability of this positive relief requiring the
104. 88 F.3d at 1338. The Eleventh and Seventh Circuits appear to have followed
Sheppard. See Akrabawi v. Carnes Co., 152 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 1998); Canup v. Chipman-
Union, Inc., 123 F.3d 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). The Ninth Circuit, however, has not. See
Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 1997).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m).
106. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
107. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). If the plaintiff pursues only a claim under section 703(m)
and prevails, but is subjected to limited remedies because the defendant successfully
asserted the same-decision defense, the plaintiff is entitled to full attorney fees, subject to
the special circumstances exception. If the plaintiff pursues more than just section 703(m)
claims, but the plaintiffs success is limited to the section 703(m) case and that success is
further limited because the defendant proved its same-decision defense, only those fees
attributable to the section 703(m) claim are recoverable.
108. Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
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defendant to do something, such as pay the plaintiff money or rehire the
plaintiff, means that in many same-decision defense cases the defendant
will not be found to have changed position as a result of the plaintiff's
lawsuit. Such a change in position is a prerequisite required by
Sheppard to be a sufficient base to make the proportionality determina-
tion that would justify granting the plaintiff attorney fees. 109 Using
the unavailability of that type of relief in Sheppard's second level
proportionality analysis operates to deny to the plaintiff the only
economic relief that is available under section 706(g)(2)(B)(i). Congress
could not have intended such a result.
In the event that the Sheppard approach is upheld in Title VII cases,
the statutory difference between the provision of attorney fees in section
706(g)(2)(B)(i) in Title VII cases and the provision for attorney fees in
age discrimination cases might then be significant. The discretionary
linchpin the court found in Sheppard, the use of the word "may," is
absent in the section of the FLSA that applies in age discrimination
cases. Section 216(b) provides, "The court in such action shall, in
addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a
reasonable attorney's fees to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the
action."'10 Because the grant of declaratory relief is included within
the term "any judgment" and because the grant of attorney fees is made
mandatory by the term "shall," nothing about the Sheppard analysis
would apply in age discrimination cases in which the defendant
successfully asserts the same-decision defense.
In sum, the ADEA should be interpreted to allow the plaintiff to
establish the defendant's liability by proving age was a motivating factor
in the decision she challenges. If the defendant then fails to prove that
it would have made the same decision even if it had not considered age,
the plaintiff is entitled to full remedies, including unpaid wages and
front pay as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Further, the
plaintiff should also be entitled to liquidated damages if she proves that
the defendant's violation was willful. On the other hand, if the
defendant successfully proves that it would have made the same decision
109. The relief that is available under section 706(g)(2)(B), other than attorney fees and
costs, appears not to count in the second level proportionality analysis proposed by the
Fourth Circuit in Sheppard. First, because the Supreme Court denigrated the significance
of simple declaratory relief in Farrar, the grant of a declaratory order that the defendant
discriminated against the plaintiff is not counted in Sheppard's proportionality analysis.
Second, unless the plaintiff continues to be employed by the defendant, courts may not
issue an injunction prohibiting the defendant from discriminating against the plaintiff in
the future. Thus, that trigger for the proportionality analysis would be available in same-
decision defense cases only when the plaintiff continued to work for the defendant.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
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even if it had not considered age, then the plaintiff's remedies should be
limited to a declaratory order that the defendant discriminated against
the plaintiff, injunctive relief against the defendant under the general
standards for granting injunctions, and mandatory attorney fees
attributable to her individual disparate treatment claim.
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